Bringing Domestic Preferences Back Into the Budget: The Politics of Fiscal Consolidation in Italy (1992-1998) by Marzinotto, Benedicta
Bringing Domestic Preferences Back Into the Budget:
The Politics of Fiscal Consolidation in Italy (1992-1998)
Benedicta Marzinotto
Florence, September 2002
Abstract
This paper argues that the content of Italy’s fiscal consolidation in the 1990s
has been largely influenced by domestic socio-political coalitions. Namely,
the preference over either spending cuts or revenue increases, at the macro-
level, and more so, at the micro-level, the preference over specific spending
and revenue items have been affected by socio-economic interests and by
partisan Government actors. Here, the colour of Government matters to the
extent in which it facilitates or hinders interest groups’ access to policy-
making, thereby determining their actual political power. The issue of the
composition of fiscal consolidation contributes to a better understanding of
Italy’s significant adjustment. Paradoxically, fiscal austerity has allowed, in a
country such as Italy, a more legitimate redistribution of public resources
and hence guaranteed their ‘social embeddness’ (and legitimacy).
1. Introduction
The present paper analyses Italy’s European convergence process in
the 1990s. Because the inflation, interest and exchange rate criteria -
imposed in the Maastricht Treaty as a condition for access into the
European Monetary Union (EMU)- had been relatively unproblematic
(EMI 1995, 1996), the focus here is on fiscal consolidation in 1992-98.
Having Italy’s political and economic elites accepted and internalised
the goal of balanced budgets since the mid-1980s (Verzichelli 1999),
one of the most interesting questions relates to the differences in fiscal
strategies successive Governments adopted between 1992 and 1998.
It is here argued that the composition of fiscal adjustment in the
1990s –at the aggregate level, the preference over either a revenue- or
an expenditure-based consolidation- has been largely influenced by
socio-political coalitions. Domestic coalitions have determined both a
priori and ex post Governments’ preferences over the content of yearlyinterventions. Also, the sequencing of fiscal reforms confirms the role
played by both partisan government -responsive to specific societal
claims- and by interest groups. The ‘social embeddness’ of Italy’s fiscal
reforms in the 1990s (Granovetter 1985) is also explanation to the
country’s extraordinary (and theoretically challenging) success at
consolidating with a 6%-of-GDP change in the primary surplus from
1992 to 1997. Paradoxically, fiscal austerity has allowed Italian
authorities to better perform the State’ redistribution function.
A closer look at the composition of fiscal consolidation reveals
some important aspects about the politics of retrenchment in EMU
candidates. Already, differences in the content of EMU-induced fiscal
reforms contradict recent arguments about the rapid convergence of
economic policy-making in the EU. If free movement of capital and the
internationalisation of production may have reduced Governments’
range of policy options, still cross-national variations persist. So to
say, convergence is a rhetoric exercise more than a political reality.
Even when looking at individual countries, preferences over the
content of fiscal consolidation seem to vary. If different Governments
under the important threat of exclusion from EMU happened to follow
different fiscal strategies, then any external constraint, being it
economic or institutional, is not powerful enough to completely empty
Governments’ preferences and hence their room for economic policy
manoeuvre. Above all, the main factor affecting the preference over
revenue- or expenditure-based adjustments is parties’ and interest
groups’ preference over the role of Government in an economy.
The exercise of identifying the (socio-political) determinants of
fiscal consolidation is relevant also for the long-term sustainability of
sound public finances. In fact, in recent times, economists have
showed that expenditure-based fiscal adjustments –those focusing on
cuts to primary transfers and public wages- are likely to be more
successful than revenue-based consolidations in the sense that fiscal
discipline lasts longer and has greater growth effects ((Alesina and
Perotti 1995; Perotti 1996; Perotti, Strauch et al. 1998).2. Dimensions of Fiscal Consolidation and their Correlation
The Maastricht Treaty provisions imposed that Member States willing
to partake of the emerging EMU would have to reach a public deficit
and debt not greater than 3% and 60% of GDP, respectively. If the
debt criterion was soon left in the background, the interpretation of
the 3%-deficit target was extremely strict. By 1997, almost all EMU
candidates had succeeded in meeting the 3% reference value. But,
they had done so following different fiscal consolidation strategies,
some of them cutting primary expenditures, others relying almost
exclusively on revenue increases (e.g. Italy).
Fiscal consolidations can be analysed along four dimensions:
timing, extent, composition and sequencing1. In Italy, most significant
budget interventions took place first in 1992 and then in 1996 when
the Prodi Government succeeded in passing special legislation under
the name ‘Intervention for Europe’. Namely, the external constraint
has been the determinant of the reform timing. Indirectly, the Treaty
with its imposition of a numerical target has been also responsible for
the extent of the adjustment2. Starting from a precarious fiscal stance
in 1992, Italy experienced the largest change in general government
structural balance in the EU between 1990 and 1999. In this respect,
when looking at the extent of the adjustment, ‘tying-one’s-hands’
theories seem to be indeed the best explanation (table 1).
On the contrary, it is here argued that the composition of reform
is better explained by domestic variables. References to the most
appropriate fiscal consolidation strategy were not absent from EU
documents (European Commission 2002). European economists and
1 Economic literature has investigated also on the duration of fiscal consolidations.
Economists seem but to agree that this dimension is dependent of the composition of
consolidation. The more the adjustment tackles primary expenditures, the more likely
it is that it will be also protracted (von Hagen et al 2001). The same would actually
apply for the extent of reform. The same strand of literature argues that expenditure-
based consolidations as opposed to revenue-based are likely to register a greater
change in primary surplus.
2 By extent, economic literature means the change in primary structural surplus
(Alesina/Perotti 1995).technocrats seemed generally to agree on the fact that the recipe to
balanced budgets had to concern primary expenditures.
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In the case of Italy, this perception was widespread among national
elites too, and was related had to the origins of the country’s fiscal
problems. It was believed that its disappointing fiscal performance
had been affected by lavish spending due to the incremental nature of
spending decisions as they were taking place against an institutional
framework in which the Parliament -open to its numerous clienteles-
had excessive amendments power over Government budget proposals
(Monorchio 1996). But, Italy’s budgetary adjustment was concentrated
on the revenue side of the budget. New resources contributed to the
adjustment for about 6% of GDP, while expenditures’ contribution
amounted to circa 3% of GDP (BI 1999; European Commission 2000).
The fourth dimension of fiscal reform is its sequencing. In 1992-
1999, at times, a new Government would follow the strategy of its
predecessor; other times, especially in the case of mini-budgets, it
would alter both extent and composition. That sequencing diverged is
an important proof of the contingent role of socio-political coalitions in
affecting the content of reform. Fiscal austerity was characterised, in
the short-term at least, by some sort of ‘social embeddness’.But, is there a correlation among these dimensions of fiscal
consolidation? The most interesting link would be between extent and
composition of the adjustment3. It is generally argued that large
consolidations tend to concentrate on the revenue side because higher
taxation is relatively more politically feasible than spending cuts. This
is so because, while pro-welfare coalitions tend to be organized in
unions, taxpayers are not represented by an interest organization
(Pierson 1998). By correlating extent and composition in 1979-1998,
there is no evidence of large fiscal consolidations having been based
predominantly on higher taxation. Quite on the contrary, there seem
to be evidence that the smaller an intervention, the greater was
Governments’ reliance on additional resources (table 2.).
Table 2. Correlation between Scope and Composition
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Yet, a recognisable pattern disappears completely if the same exercise
is repeated for the time period relevant for the purpose of this study,
the years 1989-1998. Hence, the necessary extent of reform –the need
to move from a 9.6% to a 2.7% deficit by 1997- bears little explanatory
3 By extent, it is here meant the programmatic composition of yearly fiscal packages.
In fact, final budget outcomes are strongly influenced by economic trends –growth,
unemployment, inflation and interest rates- as well as by Governments’ capacity to
implement them. In that respect, Governments’ preferences are not likely to be
reflected directly in this type of data. The focus is thus exclusively on fiscal packages
as they are described in Governments’ yearly Financial Plans.power as to why Italian politico-economic authorities opted for a
revenue-based fiscal consolidation (table 3).
Table 3. Correlation between Scope and Composition
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Data Source: Own elaboration from Verzichelli 1999, 304-307. 
3.Other explanations to the content of fiscal adjustment
Other explanations, besides the above political-feasibility argument,
could help to identify the determinants behind the content of fiscal
adjustment. In particular, Institutionalists have investigated on the
impact of electoral and budget institutions on fiscal policy outcomes.
They have argued that coalition Governments are more likely to resort
to revenue-based consolidations because of the high number of veto
players. In fact, every single Government partner is committed to
defending its constituencies’ interests. In Italy, however, in the years
between 1992 and 1998, five different coalition Governments followed
but their consolidation strategies have not been all revenue-based. In
other words, what seems to matter rather than the static institutional
framework are the preferences of the actors forming the coalition.
Secondly, some other Institutionalists argued that expenditure
cuts become a feasible political exercise only when strict budgetary
institutions regulate budget policy-making. In particular, delegation of
budget policy decisions to a powerful Finance Minister is said to allow
greater fiscal discipline on the spending side of the budget. In the caseof Italy, there is no doubt that in particular the 1988 budget reform
and Prime Minister Amato’s use of the delegation option in the wake of
the 1992 crisis may have contributed to reducing the Government’s
reliance on higher taxation relative to trend (table 4). Yet, there is still
a high degree of variation, in the period 1992-1998, in the preference
over either revenue- or expenditure-based consolidations. Budgetary
reforms would then not explain fully the content of fiscal adjustments.
Instead, in the 1990s, changes to the budgetary process seem to have
been introduced ex post, in particular the reforms in 1997 and 1999,
to reflect domestic actors’ commitment to fiscal discipline.
Table 4. Budget Composition: % Share of Revenue Increases
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In sum, budget policy outcomes in Italy are mainly determined by
Government preferences filtered through political structures and
budgetary institutions but the most important filter seems to be extra-
parliamentarian negotiations with the social partners (Fig. 1). Here,
employers’ associations have traditionally contested revenue-based
consolidations and pledged instead for the introduction of some more
dramatic spending cuts. On the contrary, labour unions tended to
prefer higher taxation to spending cuts and push for a progressive
distribution of the additional fiscal burden. 
Fig. 1. The Politico-Institutional Process: From Government Preferences to Budget Policy Outcomes 
↓ Expenditure
↑ Revenue
Technical/Partisan Coalition Loose→ Strict
Coalition
       The Governmental Phase (Dpef + Gov. Budget Proposal)          The (Extra)-Parliamentarian Phase (Budget Law) 
Besides electoral and fiscal institutions, domestic preferences seem to
be paramount in the determination of the reform content. It has been
argued here that both the partisan preferences of Government actors
and those of socio-economic interests have contributed to affecting the
composition of Italy’s fiscal consolidation. Firstly, parties’ positioning
on the left-right continuum have different preferences over the content
of consolidation because they value differently the role of the State in
the economy. In fact, budget consolidation is only a relationship, but
at what level should budgets be balanced? The issue refers to the size
of Government. Anti-statist (rightist) parties would prefer spending
cuts because these reduce the involvement of the State into the
national economy. On the other side, the Left (or new-fascist parties)
would opt for the second strategy, revenue increases, because this
means increasing or, at least, preserving the role of the State.
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UnionsSecondly, consolidation is about equity4. Once a Government
has decided to insist either on spending cuts or tax hikes, it will have
to establish where to place the burden of the adjustment, i.e. cut
spending from whom and impose higher taxation on whom. Here, the
role of socio-economic interests is particularly relevant. Italian unions
have accepted higher revenues in exchange for greater progressivity,
while employers have opposed them and pledged for spending cuts.
4.Public Finances in 1992-1998
By 1997, Italy had succeeded in bringing the public deficit from 9.6%
down to 2.7%. The adjustment was concentrated on the revenue side
of the budget. In 1997, at the end of the EMU-induced fiscal
consolidation, direct taxes increased as a proportion of GDP (table 5).
Table 5. Indirect and Direct Taxes; General Government
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4 The third important issue is efficiency. Usually, this is measured as Governments’
capacity to implement a certain programme. It is about efficient administration.
Here, on the contrary, because the interest lies mainly in the governmental and
parliamentarian phases of the budget process, efficiency is defined as actors’
consideration of the ‘efficiency’ of an austerity measure in terms of its capacity to
fulfil its function. For example, would higher social contributions be an efficient way
to increase Government resources? Policy makers would have to construct a realistic
prediction about the level of unemployment in the following year.Revenues from direct taxes had followed an irregular trend largely
conditioned by the pressures of socio-political coalitions. In 1997,
indirect taxes slightly increased as a proportion of GDP and more so
until 1999. While social spending increased slightly until 1997, the
most remarkable expenditure restraint has affected Government
consumption. The trend in consumption has been mainly determined
by the development of compensations for employees (table 6).
Table 6. Total Consumption; General Government
Italy 1991-1999
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5.The Programme-Approach
The aggregate composition of fiscal consolidation does not offer a
complete picture of the content of fiscal reform and of the role of socio-
political coalitions in determining such a content. Public programmes
will be studies in detail. Here, the notion of redistributive trade-offs is
much more visible. In particular, the thesis will concentrate on the
politics of social security contributions (SSC), on the revenue side of
the budget, and that of public employment, on the expenditure side. It
is argued that different partisan Governments supported by different
socio-political coalitions would solve differently the choice betweenemployment creation (private employment stimulated via low SSC)
and wage equality (public employment).
6.Conclusion
Italy’s choice for higher taxation raises a set of intriguing questions.
First, it is interesting to determine why a country where, in the 1990s,
external constraints proved so successful in pushing reform through
did circumvent external and domestic experts’ indications about the
most appropriate fiscal consolidation strategy. Secondly, it is quite
intriguing that a country suffering from severe competitiveness
problems (especially with the lira’s real appreciation in 1989-1992)
and just about to give up the exchange rate as a competitiveness-
boosting policy tool decided to increase taxation which, by pushing
labour costs up, may have hindered competitiveness even further.
This paper argues that the composition of fiscal consolidation
has been rather determined by domestic socio-political variables and
in particular by the preferences of partisan Government actors and of
socio-economic interests. The official opening of the budgetary process
to the social partners has enhanced the role of specific constituencies,
labour unions and employers’ associations. Their contribution to the
process of budgetary policy has guaranteed the social embeddness of
fiscal decisions and allowed a significant fiscal adjustment.
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